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Abstract
This paper examines a perfectly discriminating contest (all-pay auction) with two
asymmetric players. We focus on unordered valuations. Valuations are endogenous (poly-
nomial functions) and depend on the effort each player invests in the contest. The shape
of the valuation function is common knowledge and differs between the contestants. Some
key properties of R&D races, lobbying activity and sport contests are captured by this
framework. After analyzing the unique mixed strategy equilibrium, we derive a closed
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1 Introduction
Although commonly assumed to be fixed, the size of the prize in a contest may in fact be
endogenous and depend on the effort made by the contestants. In particular, a higher level
of effort may lead to higher valuations.1 In other words, the effort expended in a contest may
increase both the probability of winning and the size of the prize. Moreover, contestants may
differ with respect to the magnitude of this effect, and the same effort levels may lead to a
different valuation of winning the contest (Kaplan, Luski, Sela, and Wettstein, 2002).
Such an environment is descriptive of several economic issues. In R&D races, for example,
an increase in the amount of resources spent on developing new technologies may result
in a shorter product pipeline and in the firm winning the race. At the same time, the
additional resources may improve the quality of the final product and therefore its market
value. Asymmetric market structures and differences in marketing, existing product variety
or spill-over effects to related research projects are likely to lead to differences in the marginal
value of R&D spending. Organizational differences in research departments or a different
composition of inputs into the research process may likewise lead to different values of winning
the race. In some sense, academic hiring efforts may follow a similar pattern. As long as
universities attempt to attract faculty by offering productivity enhancing inducements, such
as research funds, expanded seminar series or access to data sets, they are likely to increase
the productivity of the potential new hire and at the same time the value of being able to
hire the desired candidate.
In the classical example of a lobbying contest, the value of the legislation enacted or the
project awarded may depend on the magnitude of the contribution to the political institution
involved. Asymmetries may enter the contest through the pre-existing political connection
of the lobbyist, so that an organization with conservative credentials would obtain a more
favourable outcome with a conservative government than a more liberal lobbyist. Lastly, in
professional sports, the effort invested by a team increases its expected score making a win
more likely. In addition, conditional on having won the game, a higher score may raise the
reputation of the team. For teams quoted on the stock market, such as several European soc-
cer teams, this may translate into additional stock price gains.2 Again, differences between
teams may lead to asymmetries in this effect.
This paper examines the equilibrium of a contest with endogenous rewards and derives
the aggregate expenditure of the contestants – which is the main contribution of the paper.
Indeed, it is useful for the organizer of the contest to know the expected aggregate expenditures
if he would like to maximize it and then to affect the design of the contest. It might be the case
1Higher effort levels can also lead to a lower value of winning a contest. In a war of attrition, for example,
the effort spent to win is likely to make the winner more vulnerable in future conflicts and contestants prefer
to win at lower effort levels.
2Indeed, players were also stockholders when soccer clubs issued the first shares.
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in R&D races. We examine a contest modeled as an all-pay auction, that is a situation in which
the contestant investing the largest effort will win with certainty. Regardless of whether they
won or not, all contestants have to pay their effort cost. Information is assumed to be complete
and valuations are asymmetric and endogenous (polynomial functions). For simplicity, the
analysis is limited to two participants. The payoff from winning the contest, that is the
valuation less the cost of effort, is assumed to decline strictly in effort despite valuations that
increase in the invested effort. Similar to traditional all-pay auctions, the participants in the
contest thus prefer to win at lower effort levels. This assumption contrasts with Amegashie
(2001) who investigates situations where the returns to additional expenditures in all-pay
auctions exceed the costs and players therefore could aim to win with higher efforts. Contrary
to the case where payoffs strictly decrease he finds that a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
exists.
A second related paper is Kaplan, Luski, and Wettstein (2003), who investigate a model
of innovation and R&D races with a structure similar to an all-pay auction. Information is
complete, values and innovation cost are time dependent and firms compete in when to bring
the innovation to the market. In consequence, the usual equivalence of staying out of the
contest and exercising zero effort does not apply. In contrast to our paper, a closed form
solution for expected aggregate expenditure is not given. Siegel (2009, 2010) also studies
all-pay auctions with complete information and non-ordered contestants. The differences
are in the levels of generality. Whereas Siegel’s broad approach covers quite general model
specifications – in particular he focuses on contests where all-pay auction is a sub-class of
contests – our more specific set-up allows us to determine a closed form solution for expected
equilibrium expenditures thanks to the incomplete Beta functions.3 This result could be
useful for applications of contests with – polynomial – endogenous rewards as in R&D races.
Three other recent papers with complete information are also related to our work. In-
terestingly, Chowdhury (2009) investigates the two contestants all-pay auction with winning
payoffs as non-monotonic functions of their own efforts. He finds conditions under which a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists and determines the unique mixed strategy Nash equi-
librium. Furthermore, Siegel (2012) generalizes the results of Siegel (2009) for n contestants
to a model with non-monotonic payoff functions. Sacco and Schumtzler (2008) characterize
pure and mixed strategies Nash equilibria with contestants’ valuation as a function of both
own and rival efforts. In addition to their theoretical results they focus on an experimental
analysis. Yet, as the other papers with complete information these do not provide a closed
form solution for expected equilibrium expenditures.
A related paper with incomplete information is Kaplan, Luski, Sela, and Wettstein (2002)
who investigate an all-pay auction where the rewards are additively or multiplicatively sepa-
3Siegel (2010) provides an algorithm to solve equilibrium expenditures in the general framework of Siegel
(2009).
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rable in the type of the players. This setting seems well-suited to R&D races, political contest
or lobbying activities. Kaplan, Luski, Sela, and Wettstein (2002) solve for the equilibrium bid
function and link the size of the reward as well as the costs of bidding to the expected sum
of equilibrium bids. Cohen, Kaplan, and Sela (2009) study an all-pay auction with additively
and multiplicatively separable rewards under incomplete information where the designer can
set the shape of the reward function. In particular, they determine that the optimal additively
separable reward is not necessarily positive. In our model, we investigate additively separable
rewards with complete information.
The next section introduces the model. While valuations are not ordered, they are regular
in the sense that over some range of effort one player has higher valuations while above a
certain threshold effort level the valuations of the other player are higher. The existence of a
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies and equilibrium effort levels are derived in Section 3. A
closed form solution for the aggregate expected equilibrium expenditure is derived in Section
4 – this is indeed the main contribution of this paper.
2 The Model
Consider two players or group of players, i = 1, 2 who choose effort levels xi ∈ R+ simultane-
ously and independently in a contest. The shape of their valuations is given by Vi(·) : R+ → R
which specifies the size of the prize as a function of their effort. The valuation of winning the
contest Vi for each i = 1, 2 consists of a common element v and the additive polynomial func-
tion βix
αi
i with 0 < βi < 1 and αi ≥ 1. The shape of every player’s valuation – the constant
v and parameters αi and βi – are common knowledge at the beginning of the contest. Both
players pay their effort cost and final payoffs for each player i = 1, 2 are given by
ui(xi, xj) =

v + βix
αi
i − xi if xi > xj
v + βix
αi
i
2
− xi if xi = xj
−xi if xi < xj
In an all-pay auction bidders have to pay their effort independently of the outcome of the
contest and only the winner keeps a balance from his effort spent (unlikely to the first-price
auction with complete information for example). The following assumption captures this
element.
Assumption 1 (A1). The winning payoff is strictly decreasing with the effort spent.
Assumption A1 makes the contestants prefer winning at lower effort levels. In other words,
the net payoff from an additional unit of effort is negative and then βiαix
αi−1 < 1 for all
x ∈ [0, x˜] where x˜ is the maximum effort such as assumption A1 is satisfied. Remark that x˜
needs to be sufficiently small and is determined in the next Section. Although our set-up is
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more specific than Siegel (2009, 2010) – it is actually a special case of their model – it allows
us to determine a closed form of the aggregate expected equilibrium expenditure (which is
not possible in Siegel (2009, 2010)).4 Moreover, the shape of the valuations can be derived
because of an axiomatization.5
The case where Vi(xi) = v for all xi corresponds to a pure common value setting. It is
well-known that under these circumstances there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
As Amegashie (2001) has shown, if utility is not monotonically decreasing in effort, a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium exists. Although his framework is different, the link between in-
creasing utility and equilibrium existence is likely to apply to our set-up as well. The reward
components of the all-pay auction are depicted in Figure 1.
As valuations are dependent on the effort of the two contestants, they need not to be
ordered. In other words, for two different effort levels, the ranking of the valuations could
be reversed. If αi > αj , for example, Vj(x) > Vi(x) for all x <
(
βj
βi
) 1
αi−αj and Vj(x) ≤
Vi(x) otherwise. Non-ordered valuations seem well-suited for the real-world applications that
motivate our analysis. Indeed, with different marginal returns to effort in R&D races, lobbying
or sports contests, the ranking of the valuations depends on effort levels and valuations are
unlikely to be ordered.6
4Siegel (2009, 2010) do not specify the shape of the valuation and cost functions. Yet Siegel (2009, 2010)
also use a similar assumption to assumption A1.
5Let us denote ei(.) a differentiable and continuous functions such as Vi(.) = v + ei(.). Given the three
following assumptions
• ei(.) is a non-negative and increasing function for all xi > 0 and ei(0) = 0
• contestants prefer winning at lower effort levels (which is equivalent to our assumption A1)
• ei(.) is a homogeneous function
the shape of ei(.) is our polynomial function. Details and economic interpretations are available in a previous
draft of this paper, Bos and Ranger (2009).
6The case of ordered valuations is considered in Appendix B.
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xi
v
x˜i
V (xi)
xi
Positive payoff
Negative payoff
Figure 1: Payoff of Winning
3 Equilibrium Characterization
It is a well known result that all-pay auctions with constant heterogeneous valuations, that
is valuations that are independent of the submitted bids, have a unique equilibrium in mixed
strategies (Hillman and Riley (1989), Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996) for linear costs,
Che and Gale (1998), Che and Gale (2006), Kaplan and Wettstein (2006) and Vartiainen
(2007) for non-linear cost functions). In recent papers, Siegel (2009, 2010, 2012) extends this
result to non-ordered contestants in a general framework.
To simplify the notation we define the “weak” and the “strong” player and denote them
by the subscripts w and s, respectively. The intuition is simple: since payoffs are falling in
effort by assumption A1 there will be a level of effort after which the payoff obtained will
be negative even if the contest is won. The “weak” player determines the maximum effort
any player is willing to exercise in the contest. At this effort level its utility from winning
the contest is zero; the “strong” player, in contrast, still obtains a positive payoff at the
same effort level. Non-ordered valuations and ordered valuations are depicted in Figure 4 and
Figure 5 in Appendix C.
Definition 1. A player is called “weak” if he determines the maximum effort x˜ in the contest,
that is v+ βwx˜
αw − x˜ = 0 and v+ βsx˜αs − x˜ > 0. His opponent is called the “strong” player.
Let us consider αi > αj . If x˜ is such as v + βj x˜
αj − x˜ = 0 and x˜ >
(
βj
βi
) 1
αi−αj then
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the player i is the “strong” player. Otherwise, the player j is the “strong” player and the
maximum effort is given by x˜ such as v+βix˜
αi − x˜ = 0. Unlike in a standard all-pay auction,
it is not enough for a particular player to have the higher valuation over an interval of x
in order to be the “strong” player. Rather, the relative strength of a player is determined
not only by the difference between the valuations at a particular x but also – implicitly – by
the distance from the threshold
(
βj
βi
) 1
αi−αj which defines the order of the valuations on each
sub-interval.
It follows from the implicit function theorem that the maximum effort is increasing in βw,
decreasing in αw if x˜ < 1 and increasing in αw if x˜ > 1,
dx˜
dβw
=
x˜αw
1− βwαwx˜αw−1 > 0 and
dx˜
dαw
=
βwx˜
αw ln x˜
1− βwαwx˜αw−1

< 0 if x˜ < 1
= 0 if x˜ = 1
> 0 if x˜ > 1
 (1)
The signs follow from assumption A1.
Define the mixed strategies at the equilibrium by Fi(·) = P(X ≤ ·) for both players
i = s, w. The following proposition determines the unique Nash equilibrium strategies for the
two players and the corresponding equilibrium payoffs.
Proposition 1. The unique Nash equilibrium is in mixed strategies as follows. Players choose
their effort randomly according to the cumulative distributions functions
Fs(x) =
x
v + βwxαw
for all x ∈ [0, x˜]
Fw(x) =
v + βsx˜
αs − x˜+ x
v + βsxαs
for all x ∈ [0, x˜]
And the expected equilibrium payoffs are
u?s = βsx˜
αs − βwx˜αw
u?w = 0
Proof. Let us define v˜i(x) = v + βix
αi − x and c˜i(x) = x. Then, the bidders’ expected utility
could be written as Fi(x)v˜i(x)− (1−Fi(x))c˜i(x). Observe that v˜i and −c˜i are continuous and
strictly decreasing, v˜i(0) = v and limx→+∞ v˜i(x) < 0 and v˜−1s (0) > v˜−1w (0) = x˜. Consequently
all assumptions of Siegel (2010) are satisfied. In addition what he called the threshold T of
the contest is in our case the maximum effort x˜ of the “weak” bidder. Thus, Theoreom 3 of
Siegel (2010) can be applied and our result follows. 
Observe that the equilibrium expected payoff of the “weak” player is independent of
the parameters of the contestants’ value functions. The expected equilibrium payoff of the
“strong” depends on its own valuation and, via its equilibrium strategy, on the parameters of
its opponent.
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Corollary 1. The expected equilibrium payoff of the “strong” player is (i) decreasing in βw
and (ii) decreasing in αw if x˜ > 1 and increasing otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
This asymmetry in the parameter effects is interesting for its implications. As the payoff
of the “strong” player is given by βsx˜
αs − βwx˜αw the impact of the reward parameters βw
and αw comes from two sources. On one hand we can identify a parameter effect from the
endogenous valuation of the “weak” player independent of the effort level, in which a higher
βw (respectively a smaller αw if x˜ < 1 and a higher one if x˜ > 1) reduces the payoff of the
“strong” player independent of the effort levels. The maximum effect, on the other hand,
works through the impact of the relative values of βw and αw on x˜. If the maximum effect
and the parameter effect have contradictory signs, the latter dominates.
It is possible to compare the (standard) all-pay auction with exogenous valuations Vi(x) =
vi and our setup where Vi(x) = v+ βix
αi .7 Even if rewards lead to either a higher or a lower
valuation than in the standard case of all-pay auction, it is convenient to assume that the
maximum effort is the same in the endogeneous and standard all-pay auctions. Indeed, the
maximum effort could be decided ex ante, for example as a limit of the expenditure in an
R&D race. In consequence, in the standard all-pay auction valuations are ordered and the
“weak” contestant is the one with the lowest valuation. She determines her maximum effort
equal to her valuation vw such that vw = x˜ = v + βwx˜
αw . Then, vs, the valuation of the
“strong” contestant is superior to v + βwx˜
αw .
Corollary 2. The expected equilibrium payoff of the “strong” player in the all-pay auction
with polynomial rewards is lower than in a standard all-pay auction if and only if her valuation
vs is superior to v + βsx˜
αs.
This result comes from the comparison of the players’ expected equilibrium payoff given by
Proposition 1 and the contestants’ expected equilibrium payoff given by Hillman and Riley
(1989) and Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996) in the standard all-pay auction which is
vs − vw for the “strong” player.
4 Aggregate Expenditures
We now derive an explicit expression for the expected equilibrium expenditure of both con-
testants by means of the incomplete Beta functions. We present a very short overview of
the family of incomplete Beta functions which are a useful tool for the computations of the
7The analysis does not change if the exogenous part of the valuations vi is not common to both contestants
and Vi(x) = vi + βix
αi .
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expected revenues. The incomplete Beta functions belongs to the general class of hypergeo-
metric functions and are studied in detail Spanier and Oldham (1987) Chapter 58 (see also
Temme (1996) for a more recent textbook).8
Definition 2. The incomplete Beta function, B(ν, µ, x), with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, µ ∈ R, ν > 0, is
given by the Euler integral representation:
B(ν, µ, x) =
∫ x
0
tν−1
(1− t)1−µdt
Theorem 1. The incomplete Beta function, B(ν, µ, x), with 0 ≤ x < 1, µ ∈ R, ν > 0, is
given by the expansion series:
B(ν, µ, x) =
(1− x)µ
ν
∞∑
j=0
(µ+ ν)j
(1 + ν)j
xj+ν
where (y)n denotes the Pochhammer symbol such that
(y)n =
Γ(j + y)
Γ(y)
,
where Γ(.) is the special function Gamma.
Proposition 2. The aggregate expected equilibrium expenditures are given by
ERs =

− v
βw
[
1 +
1
βw
ln(1− βw)
]
if αw = 1
x˜− 1
αwvφ
2
αw
B
(
2
αw
, 1− 2
αw
,
φx˜αw
1 + φx˜αw
)
if αw > 1
ERw =

1− βs
βs
[
ln(1 + ϕx˜)
(
x˜+
v
βs
)
− x˜
]
if αs = 1
x˜− 1
αsvϕ
2
αs
B
(
2
αs
, 1− 2
αs
,
ϕx˜αs
1 + ϕx˜αs
)
− βsx˜
αs − βwx˜αw
αsv2ϕ
1
αs
B
(
1
αs
, 1− 1
αs
,
ϕx˜αs
1 + ϕx˜αs
)
if αs > 1
with x˜ = v + βwx˜
αw , ϕ = βsv and φ =
βw
v .
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The Euler integral form of the incomplete Beta functions is used in the proof to identify
it. An explicit form of the expected revenues are given in Appendix A by the means of the
expansion series of the incomplete Beta functions.
8The incomplete Beta function converges to the standard Beta Function when x = 1.
9
Assuming a linear relationship between effort and the valuations, αs = αw = 1, one can
simplify the expression for ERw to
ERw =
1− βs
1− βw
v
βs
[
−1 +
(
1− βw + βs
βs
)
ln
(
βs
1− βw + 1
)]
The relationship between the expected equilibrium expenditure for both players and the val-
ues for βw and βs can be shown graphically (Figure 2 and Figure 3 with v = 2).
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Βw
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
ERs
Figure 2: ERs for αs = αw = 1
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Βw
0.0
0.5
1.0
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0
5
10
15
20
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Figure 3: ERw for αs = αw = 1
The features of the individual expenditures that we observe in graphs 2 and 3 can be
extended to all values of αs and αw. It is thus possible to compare the standard all-pay auction
with exogenous valuations Vi(x) = vi with our setup where Vi(x) = v + βix
αi . Qualitatively,
βi and αi (when x˜ > 1) play the same role as vi in the standard framework and αi (when
x˜ ≤ 1) the inverse one and the results should comparatively similar with respect to individual
expected equilibrium expenditure. The following corollary confirms this intuition for all value
of αs, αw, βs, βw and v.
Corollary 3. The individual expected equilibrium expenditures
(i) of the “strong” player are increasing in βw and decreasing in αw if x˜ ≤ 1.
(ii) of the “strong” player are independent of βs and αs.
(iii) of the “weak” player are decreasing in βs, increasing in αs if x˜ ≤ 1.
(iv) of the “weak” player are increasing in βw, decreasing in αw if x˜ ≤ 1 and increasing in
αw if x˜ > 1.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
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We are not able to compute the sign of the derivatives of the role of the parameters αs on
the “weak” player’s and αw on the “strong” player’s expected equilibrium expenditure when
x˜ > 1. Yet, we did not find any example which could contradict the intuition given above.
These results (Corollary 3) may have implications for the designer of a contest. If the
designer is interested in eliciting the largest amount of effort, in cases where the effort accrues
directly to him, and if he can manipulate the contest technology of both players, Corollary
3 indicates a method to achieve this goal. In addition, the contestants themselves have an
incentive to influence the parameters in the valuation functions. A “weak” firm in an R&D
race, for example, would prefer a larger value for βw and a smaller value for αw if x˜ ≤ 1
(respectively a higher value if x˜ > 1) in order to decrease the expected equilibrium payoff of
its competitor (see Corollary 1). If the contestant can chose the parameters αi and βi at some
cost before the beginning of the contest, the game can be extended to include the pre-contest
selection of the contest technology.
As in Section 3 for Corollary 2, we compare our setup where Vi(x) = v + βix
αi with the
standard all-pay auction where the valuation vw of the “weak player” is such that vw = x˜.
Corollary 4. The expected equilibrium expenditures of the “strong” player in the all-pay
auction with polynomial rewards is lower than in the standard all-pay auction.
Proof. As vw > v + βwx
αw for all effort inferior to x˜, the “strong” player’s mixed strategy
in the contest with rewards is stochastically dominated by the one in the standard contest.
Then, the result follows from ERs = x˜−
∫ x˜
0
Fs(x)dx. 
The effect on the expected equilibrium expenditures of the “weak” contestant is not clear.
Indeed, as the payoff of the “strong bidder” decreases if vs > v + βsx˜
αs , the effect of the
reward on the mixed strategy of the “weak” contestant is ambiguous.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we examine a perfectly discriminating contest (all-pay auction) with two asym-
metric players and polynomial valuations in a complete information environment. Similar
to real-world situations, we postulate that the value of winning depends on the effort levels
invested. In particular, we assume that higher effort levels lead to higher prizes but that this
increase is smaller than the cost of effort. The contestants thus prefer to win at lower effort
levels. We believe that this set-up captures the nature of many contests such as R&D races,
lobbying games or sports events.
As the valuation functions are not symmetric, we can define the “strong” contestant as
the one having the higher effort limit. The effort limit is level of effort after which the payoff
obtained will be negative even if the contest is won. The “weak” contestant, analogously, has
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the lower effort limit. Within these limits, valuations need not be ordered, however, as (due
to the asymmetry) both players may have the higher valuation at different levels of effort.
This notwithstanding, we show that the equilibrium strategies and expected payoffs depend
on the strength of the player.
In equilibrium, the expected equilibrium payoff of the “strong” player is positive and de-
pends on the parameters of both players’ valuation function. In particular, it is decreasing
in the steepness of the “weak” player’s valuations. We are able to characterize the expected
expenditure thanks to the incomplete Beta functions. This result could be useful for applica-
tions of contests with polynomial rewards as in R&D races. For example, the organizer of the
contest could provide incentives to contestants such as they would select a contest technology
(their parameters αi and βi) which would increase the expected aggregate expenditures.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Corollary 1. (i)
∂u?s
∂βw
=
dx˜
dβw
(βsαsx˜
αs−1 − βwαwx˜αw−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
maximum effect
− x˜αw︸︷︷︸
parameter effect
(2)
=
dx˜
dβw
(
βsαsx˜
αs−1 − 1) (3)
< 0 (4)
To arrive at equation (3) from (2) we apply the implicit function theorem to x˜ = v+βwx˜
αw
in x˜ and βw such that
dx˜
dβw
(
1− βwαwx˜αw−1
)
= x˜αw . The result then follows from assumption
A1 and (1).
(ii)
∂u?s
∂αw
=
dx˜
dαw
(
βsαsx˜
αs−1 − βwαwx˜αw−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
maximum effect
− βwx˜αw ln x˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
parameter effect
(5)
=
dx˜
dαw
(
βsαsx˜
αs−1 − 1)+ x˜αw ( dx˜
dαw
dβw
dx˜
− βw ln x˜
)
(6)
= x˜αw
(
dx˜
dαw
dβw
dx˜
− βw ln x˜
)
(7)
=
dx˜
dαw
(
βsαsx˜
αs−1 − 1) (8)
Using equations (2) and (3), βsαsx˜
αs−1−βwαwx˜αw−1 = (βsαsx˜αs−1−1)+ x˜αw dβw
dx˜
. Then
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(6) follows. We get (7) as
dx˜
dαw
dβw
dx˜
− βw ln x˜ = 0 from (1). In (8), the term between brackets
is negative from assumption A1 and the sign of
dx˜
dαw
is given by (1).

Proof of the Proposition 2. The expected equilibrium expenditure of effort is given by ERi =
x˜−
∫ x˜
0
Fi(x)dx for i = w, s.
1. Computation of ERw.
Let us denote ϕ = βsv . If αs = 1, it follows that
∫ x˜
0
Fw(x)dx = (v + (βs − 1)x˜)
∫ x˜
0
dx
v + βsx
+
∫ x˜
0
x
v + βsx
dx
=
v + (βs − 1)x˜
v
∫ x˜
0
dx
1 + ϕx
+
1
βs
∫ x˜
0
1− 1
1 + ϕx
dx
= −1− βs
βs
(
v
βs
+ x˜
)
ln(1 + ϕx˜) +
x˜
βs
Therefore,
ERw =
1− βs
βs
[
ln(1 + ϕx˜)
(
x˜+
v
βs
)
− x˜
]
The derivative in x˜ and the boundedness condition guarantee that ERw is positive.
If αs > 1
∫ x˜
0
Fw(x)dx = (βsx˜
αs − βwx˜αw)
∫ x˜
0
dx
v + βsxαs
+
∫ x˜
0
x
v + βsxαs
dx
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Moreover, ∫ x˜
0
dx
v + βsxαs
=
1
v
∫ x˜
0
dx
1 + ϕxαs
=
1
αsvϕ
1
αs
∫ ϕx˜αs
0
y
1
αs
−1
1 + y
dy (9)
=
1
αsvϕ
1
αs
∫ ϕx˜αs
1+ϕx˜αs
0
t
1
αs
−1
(1− t) 1αs
dt (10)
=
1
αsvϕ
1
αs
B
(
1
αs
, 1− 1
αs
,
ϕx˜αs
1 + ϕx˜αs
)
(11)
=
x˜
v
Γ
(
1
αs
)(
1
1 + ϕx˜αs
)1− 1
αs
∞∑
j=0
(ϕx˜αs)j
(1 + αsj)Γ(
1
αs
+ j)
(12)
To obtain equations (9) and (10), we define y = ϕxαs and t = y1+y . As
ϕx˜αs
1+ϕx˜αs ∈ (0, 1) and
1
αs
> 0, equation (10) is the Euler integral representation of an incomplete Beta function and
equation (12) comes from his expansion series given by Theorem 1.
Moreover, ∫ x˜
0
x
v + βsxαs
dx =
1
αsvϕ
2
αs
∫ ϕx˜αs
1+ϕx˜αs
0
t
2
αs
−1
(1− t) 2αs
dt (13)
=
1
αsvϕ
2
αs
B
(
2
αs
, 1− 2
αs
,
ϕx˜αs
1 + ϕx˜αs
)
(14)
As before, we find (13) after change in variables as for equation (9) and (10).
Therefore,
ERw = x˜− x˜
v
Γ
(
2
αs
)(
1
1 + ϕx˜αs
)1− 2
αs
∞∑
j=0
(ϕx˜αs)j
(2 + αsj)Γ(
2
αs
+ j)
− x˜βsx˜
αs − βwx˜αw
v
Γ
(
1
αs
)(
1
1 + ϕx˜αs
)1− 1
αs
∞∑
j=0
(ϕx˜αs)j
(1 + αsj)Γ(
1
αs
+ j)
2. Computation of ERs.
Let us denote φ = βwv . If αw = 1
ERs = − 1
βw
[(1− βw)x˜+ 1
φβw
ln(1 + φx˜)]
= − v
βw
(
1 +
1
βw
ln(1− βw)
)
which is positive as βw < 1.
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If αw > 1 the calculation is the same as for ERw, thus
ERs = x˜
1− 1
v
Γ
(
2
αw
)(
1
1 + φx˜αw
)1− 2
αw
∞∑
j=0
(φx˜αw)j
(2 + αwj)Γ(
2
αw
+ j)


Proof of the Corollary 3. We recall that the expected equilibrium expenditure is given by
ERi = x˜−
∫ x˜
0
Fi(x)dx for i = w, s.
(i)
∂ERs
∂βw
=
dx˜
dβw
(1− Fs(x˜))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
∫ x˜
0
xαw+1
(v + βwxαw)2
dx
> 0
∂ERs
∂αw
=
dx˜
dαw
(1− Fs(x˜))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
∫ x˜
0
xαw+1βw lnx
(v + βwxαw)2
dx
which is negative if x˜ ≤ 1.
(ii) The mixed strategies and the maximum effort are independent of βs and αs. Hence the
result.
(iii)
∂ERw
∂βs
= −
∫ x˜
0
v(x˜αs − xαs) + xαs(x˜− x)
(v + βsxαs)2
dx < 0. Moreover, if x˜ ≤ 1,
∂ERw
∂αs
= −βs
∫ x˜
0
vx˜αs ln x˜− xαs lnx(v − x˜+ x)
(v + βsxαs)2
dx
≥ βs
∫ x˜
0
xαs(x˜− x) lnx
(v + βsxαs)2
dx
≥ 0
(iv) Using assumption A1 and equation (1), it follows that
∂ERw
∂βw
=
dx˜
dβw
(1− Fs(x˜))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−
∫ x˜
0
dx˜
dβw
αsβsx˜
αs−1 − 1
v + βsxαs
dx > 0 and
∂ERw
∂αw
=
dx˜
dαw
(1− Fs(x˜))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−
∫ x˜
0
dx˜
dαw
αsβsx˜
αs−1 − 1
v + βsxαs
dx which is negative if x˜ ≤ 1 and
non-negative if x˜ > 1.

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Appendix B: Ordered Valuations
An alternative way to analyze the problem would be to consider ordered valuations such
that Vi(x) > Vj(x) over the relevant range of x. Due to the form of the valuation func-
tions, two separate cases have to be examined: αi > αj for x >
(
βj
βi
) 1
αi−αj and αi < αj for
x ≤
(
βj
βi
) 1
αi−αj . In the following, let us denote the threshold
(
βj
βi
) 1
αi−αj by x?.
Case (i): αi > αj, Positive Minima
If the maximum effort x˜ is superior to the effort level x? the mixed equilibrium strategies
for both players can be computed. Otherwise, there is no positive density in equilibrium. The
main difference to the standard all-pay auction, in a sense, is that the non-participation level
of effort and the minimum effort level have to be distinguished. In particular, the players do
not participate below the threshold level x?. In the following, only the results that do not
follow straightforwardly from Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries
(1996) will be given.
Lemma 1. If the minimum effort x? is strictly positive and inferior to x˜ then the two players’
strategies have an atom such that
Fi(x
?) =
x?
Vj(x?)
and Fj(0) =
Vj(x
?)
Vi(x?)
Fi(x
?) +
Vi(x˜)− Vj(x˜)
Vi(x?)
Proof. Since the strategy spaces are the same, and expected utilities are constant at the
equilibrium we obtain Vi(x˜) − x˜ = Fj(x)Vi(x) − x and Vj(x˜) − x˜ = Fi(x)Vj(x) − x for all
x ∈ [x?, x˜]. As Vj(x˜)− x˜ = 0, the two last equations lead to the result. 
In this case, player i is “strong” and player j “weak” in the sense defined above with
probablitiy one for all x. Thus, with the exception of the common mass point at the lower
end of the distribution and the length of the strategy space, the mixed equilibrium strategies
should be the same as in the case with non-ordered valuations and i as the strong player. In
others words, for all x ∈ [x?, x˜]
Fi(x) =
x
v + βjxαj
and Fj(x) =
v + βix˜
αi − x˜+ x
v + βixαi
.
Even if the distributions are the same, the expected revenue will differ as the strategy
spaces are different. We do not provide the closed form solution here, but the computation
is straightforward and similar to the one for non-ordered valuations.
Case (ii): αi < αj, Caps
16
Here, two cases have to be distinguished. In both, player i is “strong” and player j is
“weak” for all x. If the maximum effort x˜ is inferior to x? the situation is as same as that of
ordered-valuations with polynomial rewards and the results of Proposition 1 apply. Alterna-
tively, the agents face a cap in their bids that they could not exceed such as x˜ > x?. This last
case was studied by Che and Gale (1998) with exogenous valuations. As in their paper, we
consider two cases. When x? ≤ x˜2 , there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium where the effort
of the players is x?. Otherwise, mixed strategies have to be computed. It can be shown that
the players have a nonzero density on (0, x′] and a zero density on (x′, x?) with a mass point
at x?.9 Then, with similar technical arguments than Che and Gale (1998) we find that for all
x ∈ [0, x′] Fi(x) = xVj(x) and Fj(x) = xVi(x) +
Vi(x
′)−Vj(x′)
Vi(x)
and for all x ∈ [x′, x?[ Fi(x) = x′Vj(x′)
and Fj(x) =
x′
Vi(x′) +
Vi(x
′)−Vj(x′)
Vi(x′) . To sum up, if x
? ∈ ( x˜2 , x˜)
Fi(x) =

x
v + βjxαj
for all x ∈ [0, x′]
x′
v + βjx
′αj
for all x ∈ [x′, x?[
1 for x = x?
and
Fj(x) =

x
v + βixαi
+
βix
′αi − βjx′αj
v + βixαi
for all x ∈ [0, x′]
x′
v + βix
′αi
+
βix
′αi − βjx′αj
v + βix
′αi
for all x ∈ [x′, x?[
1 for x = x?
Appendix C: Figures
In the following figures, i is the “strong” player and j the ‘weak” player.
9See the Lemma 3 of Che and Gale (1998).
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Figure 4: Unordered values
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Figure 5: Ordered Values
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